TENT-T priority projects : where do we stand? by Martellato, Dino
European Research Studies,  
Volume XIV, Issue (3), 2011 
 
 
TENT-T Priority Projects: Where do we Stand?* 
 
Dino Martellato1 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
TEN-T is intended to provide the single market with integrated modern transport 
networks, but infrastructure investment per se has other important effects. Besides reviewing 
the different reasons that justify public investment in infrastructure capital, the paper focuses 
the existing obstacles to a full implementation of TEN-T and, in particular, the funding gap, 
which has always been the most evident obstacle of them. Prospects and possible remedies 
are also briefly considered.  
 
 
Key Words: Transport, Infrastructure, Funding, Financing 
JEL Classification:  L92, O18, D92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
* This paper was presented at a meeting held at the Faculty of Economics, University of Nis in October 
2011. 
1 Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari, University of Venice, Italy. email:marteld@unive.it 
52 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XIV, Issue (3), 2011 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is also in the quality and extension of networked transport infrastructures, 
although not only in this, that the character of a State can be assessed. With the 
single market in existence and the single currency in circulation, the progress made 
by the EU and its Member States in transport networks appears limited if the results 
are compared with the original ambitions and programs. It is, therefore, worth 
asking what the problems and the perspectives are of TEN-T, i.e. the core Trans 
European Transport Network. Section 2 provides a short overview of its main steps 
and achievements. The paper then focuses the funding gap, i.e. the most evident 
TEN-T problem (Section 3), the differences between infrastructure capital and 
public investment and their relations with economic growth (Section 4) and the 
funding implications of long-term real interest rates (Section 5). The profitability 
issue (Section 6) and the budgeting issue of infrastructure investment (Section 7) are 
also considered. Section 8 is dedicated to the governance aspects with special 
reference to the Italian case. Section 9 briefly concludes.  
 
2.  Pan-European Corridors, TENs, TEN-T 
 
Pan-European transport corridors are new modern routes in Central and 
Eastern Europe envisaged to speed up integration in the European Community, 
which in the early 1990s was already set to enlarge. The European Transport 
Network (TENT-T) was planned as part of the Trans European Networks (TENs), 
i.e. the infrastructure policy embedded in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In both cases 
the aim basically was to allow goods and people to circulate quickly and easily 
across borders, and the realization of a single, multimodal network, in particular, 
was intended to parallel the completion of the single market and the start of the 
process expected to lead to the launch of the single currency.  
The TEN-T network was planned to comprise traditional infrastructure and 
equipment as well as innovative management transport systems. In December 1993 
the European Council established a group of representatives chaired by the 
Commission Vice-President H. Cristophersen to identify a limited number of 
concrete projects of major importance for the EU-12. The selected 14 projects were 
chosen on the basis of relevance and a number of other criteria, but even then the 
available financial resources appeared limited. In 1994, after the completion of the 
internal market, at the start of Stage 2 of the convergence process to the euro and the 
then foreseen acceleration in the enlargement process in the east, the ten Pan-
European Corridors and the TEN-T network coalesced into a single large program of 
infrastructure building. In 2004, i.e. just after the accession of ten new member 
countries, the list of priority projects was extended to 30  in order to take into 
account two further new entrants to what is now known as the EU-27. The series of 
30 axes had already been identified in late 2004 on the basis of proposals from the 
Member States and was devised by concentrating on major projects capable of 
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completing those implemented at national level.  Indeed, the network was intended 
to deepen European integration and completion was planned for 2020.  
Ten years later, L. Barrot, Vice-President of the EC with responsibility for 
transport in the EU-25 (Barrot, 2005) unambiguously remarked that the results had 
fallen short of the original ambitions largely because the amount of resources 
required was huge. Indeed, a true trans-European network for the then still enlarging 
EU-25 had been estimated to amount to €900bn over the period 1996-2020 (EC-DG 
TREN, 2010). The 30 TEN-T priority projects form the first layer of the European 
network of rail, road, internal waterways and sea waterway axes.  The estimated cost 
was €415bn. The priority projects basically pursue interconnection between national 
networks since road, rail and air traffic management systems or horizontal projects 
were added. The second layer is the comprehensive network which is formed by 
existing rail, road, water links and nodes. New links or the upgrading of existing 
links are expected to cost more than €500bn and consist of thousands of kilometers 
of conventional railways and particularly HSR2. While Priority Projects can benefit 
from Community resources and coordination, the completion of the comprehensive 
layer rests almost entirely with the Member States both financially and in terms of 
coordination. Each priority project is eligible to receive EU grants from only one 
source chosen among the TEN-T Programme, Cohesion funds, ERDF and the 
Research Framework Programme. Priority projects are co-financed and may benefit 
from loans and guarantees from the European Investment Bank. 
The resources available under the 2000-2006 financial perspective were 
largely insufficient to match such efforts and in 2005, the EC appointed six 
coordinators to promote a coherent framework and to look for financing schemes 
alternative to those found in the EU and the national budgets. In 2006, the EU 
further established the Trans-European Transport Network Agency (TEN-T EA)3 to 
manage the Community action in the Priority Projects. For these projects, the TEN-
T EA executive agency has now obtained full responsibility for the management and 
monitoring of projects. With the current financial perspective 2007-2013, the EU 
has made a strategic choice based on the concentration of its infrastructure 
investments  in the Priority Projects and in particular as regards cross-border 
sections, bottlenecks and access routes. The resources for the TEN-T provided by 
the EU amount to little more than €8bn, 80-85% of which are available for the 30 
Priority Projects and for the horizontal priorities. These resources are intended to 
lever on national public funding and on private funding as well. The next financial 
perspective (2014-2021) is expected to change the current dual-layer strategy into 
one formed by a priority network − largely HSR − and a “conceptual pillar” to help 
                                               
2 An HSR network is supposed to be formed by links of 300km minimum for trains running at 250km/h 
at least. 
3 The TEN-T maps are downloadable from: http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/, or: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/maps/maps_en.htm 
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integrate the various transport policies and infrastructure, i.e. something very 
difficult to figure out in practical terms (EC, 2009).   
 
3.  A Funding Gap 
 
The internal market was thought from the start to be in need of 
modernization in basically all networks, from transport and energy to 
communication, but the EU and the European national governments faced and 
continue to face the problem of finding adequate financial resources to make the 
estimated infrastructure investments. The divergence between the need for 
infrastructure investments and available funds in the old Member Countries, i.e. the 
funding gap, was evident from the early Nineties, but it has widened over the years 
since EU enlargement has compounded the effects of deepening internal integration 
on the demand for infrastructure capital. On one side, it was thought that the fast-
enlarging internal market needed more infrastructure capital to work properly and 
deliver; on the other, available funding has not grown at the same rate. This can be 
seen from the figures for the comprehensive network reported in Table 1. The effect 
of enlargement can be seen in the first section of the Table, which shows that the 
average annual cost in the TEN-T comprehensive network in the EU-27 (from the 
1996-1999 to the current 2007-2013 financial perspective) increased by 263%; while 
it decreased to 71% in the old EU-15 Member Countries. As regards the financial 
sources, it can be noted that over the three financial perspectives, the funds provided 
by the Cohesion Fund rose by 302% and those in the TENT-T Programme increased 
by 257%. The funds for regional development (ERDF) actually decreased to 89%. 
The nature of the resources is dealt with in the last section of Table 1. Grants made 
available by the EU increased by 206%, i.e. more than those in the loans offered by 
BIS (169%). In sum, financial resources contributed by the EU rose by 169% only, 
i.e. less than the total cost of the comprehensive TEN-T network (263%).  
Table 1. TENT-T Comprehensive Network  Costs  (€bn) 
(Annual average per financial perspective and ratio)   
  
A 
1996-
1999 
B 
2000-
2006 
C 
2007-
2013 Ratio C/A 
TEN-T old Member Countries  63,6 39,29 45,43 0,71 
TEN-T comprehensive network 21,2 43,14 55,71 2,63 
Programme TEN-T 0,446 0,63 1,14 2,57 
Cohesion Fund 1,646 2,36 4,97 3,02 
European Regional Dev. Fund 1,502 1,23 1,34 0,89 
European Investment Bank 5,3 5,91 7,57 1,43 
Total Community contribution 8,894 10,13 15,03 1,69 
Grants 3,612 4,22 7,46 2,06 
Grants and loans 8,912 10,13 15,03 1,69 
 Source: Own elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source  
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The current contraction in public funding in national projects clearly reflects 
the need for consolidation in public finances at the national level. This need was 
already obvious in the early Nineties, but it definitely accelerated in 2010, when the 
global financial crisis turned into the euro crisis. The limited investment made by the 
private sector in infrastructure reflects the fact that investment in non-transport 
infrastructure, such as rolling stock and other mobile goods, is held to be more 
profitable than that in infrastructure. Accordingly, public investment, which is 
essential in infrastructure investment, remained scarce while private investment, 
which, although present in infrastructure investment (such as motorways and 
airports), has continued to prefer non-infrastructure investment. This is far from 
being a European specificity. Indeed, only a small part of global long-term 
investment is devoted to infrastructure investment (Monti, 2010).  
Table 2 provides a basis for a discussion of the trend in the annual average 
cost in the 30 Priority Projects and across the last three financial perspectives. The 
available estimate shows that the average annual cost increased by 472% over the 
years. The annual average amount of EU resources and their nature are also 
displayed in Table 2. Only the resources available under the TEN-T Programme 
have grown slightly in a comparable way to costs (i.e. 400% vis-à-vis 472%). The 
Community contribution has neither increased cohesion funds sufficiently (321%) 
nor those of regional development funds (ERDF) (322%). Financing from the EIB 
grew even less (256%).      
 
Table 2. TENT-T Priority Projects Costs  (€bn) 
(Annual average per financial perspective and ratio) 
  
A 
1996-
1999 
B 
2000-
2006 
C 
2007-
2013 
Ratio 
C/A 
TEN-T Priority Projects 6,53 18,74 30,8 4,72 
Programme TEN-T 0,27 0,56 1,08 4,00 
Cohesion Fund 0,766 1,4 2,46 3,21 
European Regional Dev. Fund 0,292 0,962 0,94 3,22 
European Investment Bank 1,956 3,22 5 2,56 
Total Community contribution 3,284 6,142 9,48 2,89 
Grants 1,328 2,922 4,48 3,37 
Grants and loans 3,284 6,142 9,48 2,89 
Source:  Own elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source  
 
By 2004, the comprehensive network was estimated to cost about €900bn 
over the period 1996-2020; while the total cost of the 30 Priority Projects was 
€415bn. Assuming the estimate as a valid reference value, Table 3 shows the level 
of attainment expected by the end of 2013. Results in the 30 priority projects are 
expected to reach a level (0,67) lower than those in the comprehensive network 
(89%) even though funding and financing from the EU and EIB are going to be 
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slightly more abundant in the former case (59% against 55%). This indicates that the 
scarce Community resources have actually been concentrated on the priority 
projects, while the remaining projects of the whole network have largely been left to 
national public and private resources (116% vis-à-vis 0,73).  
 
Table 3. TEN-T Costs (€bn) 
  1996-2013 1996-2020 Ratio 
Comprehensive network 798 900 0,89 
EU and EIB 220 400 0,55 
Private sector 578 500 1,16 
Priority projects 280 415 0,67 
EU and EIB 95 162 0,59 
Private sector 185 253 0,73 
Source: Elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source 
 
Indeed, besides providing EU funds directly to major projects in the 
comprehensive network and in the priority links, the TENs and TEN-T initiatives 
aimed to leverage  on national public funds and thus promote  public funding overall 
for infrastructure investment. This strategy, however, seems to have not delivered as 
expected because the funding gap in infrastructure investment has remained 
unchanged from one financial perspective to the next. Future prospects are by no 
means better. First of all, fiscal stabilization is bound to make the scarcity of public 
funds more severe than it is now. Unlike China, India and also the United States, 
which tackled the credit crisis by increasing infrastructure spending considerably, 
the EU and the Member Countries have not inflated public expenditure in 
infrastructure. Secondly, global capital markets are expected to invert the past trend 
and make real long-term interest rates increase in relation to the on- going surge in 
infrastructure investment and the contraction of saving in emerging economies. This 
means Europe must learn to face intensified competition for equity and finance 
capital from the emerging economies.  
 
4.  Infrastructure, Public Investment and Growth 
 
Economic growth cannot be sustained without adequate net fixed capital 
formation. The expansion of economic infrastructure capital in transport, 
communications and in the different utilities is surely a necessary condition for 
economic growth. The same is largely true for social capital (hospitals, schools, 
etc.), but economic growth also critically depends on countless mobile capital goods, 
i.e. equipment— software included— and other intangible capital goods. As is 
obvious, in any knowledge-based economy, innovation contributes to growth if it 
lets productive knowledge accumulate in the system. It is for the same reason that 
depreciation allowances, which are basically made to compensate for the 
consumption of capital goods, can contribute to growth if they make it possible to 
57 
TENT-T Priority Projects: 
Where do we Stand? 
 
exploit technical progress. With the exclusion of changes in inventories and new 
residential real estate, therefore, basically all gross fixed tangible and intangible 
capital formation contributes to per capita GDP growth. Mature and emerging 
economies, nevertheless, behave differently.   
The stock of capital to output ratio has the property of being rather uniform 
across countries as it ranges between 2 and 3, whatever the level of their per capita 
GDP (e.g. McKinsey, 2010). This means that to increase per capita GDP any 
country must keep the GDP rate of growth g  and the stock rate of growth 
11  tt KK in balance: g . At the same time there is statistical evidence 
showing that the capital/output ratio tt yK  increases with respect to the investment 
rate tt yI /  (e.g. Jones, 2008) although the investment rate is neither stable over time 
nor across countries. Indeed, to get an additional percentage point of GDP, a country 
needs not to make a fixed amount of gross investment each year for keeping the rate 
of growth investment equal to that of GDP. In this regard mature economies and 
emerging economies behave differently. Even for extended periods of time, mature 
economies decrease their rate of investment as if they preferred to grow by 
increasing internal consumption rather than investment, and particularly 
infrastructure investment. In these economies the capital-output ratio is already high 
and the labour force barely grows, thus making opportunities for private investors 
less abundant. The equation tttt yKgyI 1)(  
4 shows that a low rate of 
output growth and sluggish maintenance keep the investment rate low, at the given 
capital/output ratio. Emerging economies do just the opposite as they typically take 
off by increasing exports and investment to accelerate the growth in domestic 
consumption only later on. To increase per capita GDP, the emerging economies 
need to increase the rate of investment, for a given labor force and a given rate of 
depreciation. This means that if the labor force grows, the rate of investment must be 
even higher. Hence, during the recent crisis these countries have further raised the 
investment rate and seem determined to continue to do so. Unfortunately, in order to 
increase consumption they are expected to reduce the supply of saving (McKinsey, 
2010). These tendencies will surely weigh on the demand and supply of saving at 
the global scale  and are predicted to make the cost of capital higher in real terms5.  
Since infrastructure investments are a powerful anti-cyclical demand factor, 
some countries have not failed to take stock of this property to counter the slump in 
demand in 2008 and 2009 with suitable fiscal stimuli. China and India, but also the 
                                               
4 The equation tttt
yKgyI 1)(    where ty is the GDP and   is the required rate of 
maintenance investment, is easily derived from the definition ttt
KKI  1)1(   and from the 
assumption g .    
5 This helps to preserve dynamic efficiency in the economy, i.e. a return rate on capital higher than the 
growth rate. 
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United States, have tackled the slump by increasing infrastructure spending 
considerably. China, in particular,  introduced a substantial fiscal stimulus in 2008 
($500bn) devoting a large portion to infrastructure, especially railways and China is 
currently held to have the largest HSR network and to have planned to nearly triple 
it to more than 16.000km over the next decade. This will be made possible by a 
steady public investment flow as the largest contribution to infrastructure investment 
and by an increasing amount of bank loans. Indeed, if the celebrated Keynesian 
effect of deficit spending really exists, this is surely the case of infrastructure. In the 
effort to counter a slump in real demand through the provision of low-return new 
infrastructure capital, the role of government is of key importance because the 
private sector − while being able to increase high-return non-infrastructure 
investment − has no incentive to make low-return infrastructure investment. The 
combination of low-return public investment in social infrastructure and high-return 
private investment can have the biggest impact on both demand and overall 
competitiveness. Since it is public investment that has such a strategic role, public 
expenditure in infrastructure investment should merit special treatment in budget 
policy (see Section 7) in the EU and the Member Countries. From the point of view 
of the financial cost of infrastructure investment, China and the other big 
infrastructure spenders have certainly made a clever choice in exploiting the low 
level of long-term real interest rates in the capital market during the last two 
decades.   
 
5.  Funding, Financing and Real Interest Rates 
 
Low real capital costs have formed the backdrop to investors’ decisions for 
at least the last twenty years all over the world. Real long-term interest rates started 
falling substantially from their peak in the early 1980s, but they became low by 
historical standards during the 1990s, and dipped further during the global financial 
crisis (Martellato, 2010). The descending trend in real interest rates has been 
ascribed not only to the gradual fading out of the effects of past inflation on nominal 
interest rates, an effect which dates back to the 1980s, but also to the excess of 
saving over investment at the global level which emerged later on.  Bernanke (2005) 
famously defined this secular trend the “saving glut”. It is natural to think that the 
two forces of inflation expectations under the present conditions of extraordinary 
loose monetary policy and heightened infrastructure investment in emerging 
economies could make real long-term interest rates go into reverse and start 
increasing again.  
The briefly described scenario has certainly created a potentially favorable 
environment for long-term investment during the past decade at least, but it was not 
able to avoid the lowering investment rate in mature economies, the EU included. 
As a result, a large amount of capital is currently required at global level to recover 
the historical ratio between capital and output in the mature economies and to bring 
emerging economies to the same level. Investment projects in the EU have to 
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compete with similar projects in mature economies to fund or finance the investment 
with the resources available in the global capital markets. This means that the 
difficulties encountered so far in funding and financing TENs with private resources 
are probably bound to increase in the coming years. 
A further obstacle is the uneven creditworthiness of national governments in 
the EU. The euro crisis in 2010 and the ensuing decision to pursue austerity in the 
national budgets under the Stability Growth Pact are leading to a reduction in 
government infrastructure spending. The reduction is obviously extremely 
dangerous for those countries where the accumulation of economic capital has been 
limited in the past. Indeed, prolonged underinvestment in infrastructure amid 
accelerated investment in competitor countries will feed negatively back on private 
investment in the same countries and will inevitably end up by making permanent 
the current gap in labour  productivity, output and employment growth. Therefore, if 
the low creditworthiness reflects doubts about debt sustainability, low 
creditworthiness will end up feeding back on itself through low capital formation.  
The sudden and rapid increases in bond spreads observed in May and 
November 2010 inside in the EU-EMU clearly reveal that in some countries public 
debt is perceived as risky. It does not matter if the State is directly issuing bonds or 
simply giving guarantees to the agency in charge of running the project. The real 
interest rate paid on bonds can go higher when the State becomes less creditworthy 
even if the international risk-free interest rate gets lower. Thus the highly indebted 
European countries face risks which are particularly high. 
The first victim of the 2008-2209 credit crisis was obviously bank financing, 
which made regular project financing and private-public partnerships lose ground. 
Capital constraints together with the reduced willingness of banks to extend credit in 
large amounts and for longer maturities will continue to make the financing of larger 
infrastructure projects particularly challenging. The combination of low profitability 
and high project costs is obviously impairing the possibility of some projects to have 
access to long-term financing. In reviewing the various strategic possibilities of 
financing the TEN-T  (EIB, 2009) a working group consisting of  DG TREN and 
DG  ECFIN and  EIB representatives observed that PPP programmes should be 
enhanced; but also that the difficult market conditions squeeze traditional sources of 
senior debt thus constraining such programmes. This forced the governments in the 
countries where large projects are under way to provide new emergency 
guarantee/lending facilities in 2009. As is obvious, since TENT-T is a long-term 
endeavour requiring long-term finance that bank credit can no longer provide, 
capital market access has to be improved.  
The capital market could provide finance in various ways. Infrastructure 
bonds are one old6 and obvious possibility which could be particularly interesting if 
the EU, instead of national States, decided to directly issue euro-denominated 
                                               
6 Italy issued infrastructure bonds in 1963. The EC  suggested it  in the White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment (1993).     
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debentures. This would create a new integrated bond market larger and more liquid 
than any other existing national market for euro-denominated national bonds. 
Unfortunately, this idea has never received sufficient political support in the 
European Council and the absence of an integrated bond market is thus making the 
full realization of the European network a difficult task under the current conditions 
of tight credit.  
Other forms of financing are possible. Specialized loans/instruments as an 
alternative to standard EIB loans have already been used by the EIB (EIB, 2009). 
Listed infrastructure stocks are traded on the open market and require that the 
project capability to offer an attractive return. Existing infrastructure stocks in 
Europe and all other continents include business such as toll roads, airports, port 
operators, energy and utilities that are long-term assets based on monopolistic 
positions in markets where demand is high. They form a distinct global asset class 
which is credited with a low correlation with other asset classes and their specific 
index (e.g. S&P, 2009). Infrastructure funds are typically open to institutional 
investors. The 2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure, 
also known as the Marguerite Fund, was established in 2009 to reach €1.5bn in 
2011. It is sponsored by the EIB and another five national institutions from France, 
Italy, Germany, Spain and Poland. It is expected to be a model of risk-sharing for 
other public and private funds.    
 
6.  Profitability of Infrastructure Investment 
 
Six expert groups were appointed to support the EC in addressing the 
funding and financing issue because the implementation of the vast majority of the 
TENT-T project has always been critically dependent on public funds. While the 
cost of capital has not been a major obstacle to the TENs and TEN-T, at least so far, 
the low profitability of many TEN-T projects has certainly deterred private investors 
from taking part in them, thus making their implementation totally dependent on 
public funding. The single projects cannot be appraised solely in financial terms 
because many benefits − typically those of reduced environmental costs − cannot be 
recouped in the form of fare revenue. In a purely financial appraisal, some projects 
would then be left out; while in a full cost-benefit analysis they would probably not 
be if the economic rate of return resulting from a cost-benefit analysis were higher 
than the financial rate of return. This is the case of rail projects in general and, in 
particular, of the cross-border links that are vital for the operability of the network 
and thus for the EU as such. Rail projects are coherently held to merit priority inside 
the Commission.  
TEN-T is at best the aggregation of transport corridors rather than a network 
(EC, 2010b), but current rail priority projects envisage an HSR network whose hub 
is centered on Paris with spokes going towards London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, 
Metz and Lyon-Marseilles. The subsystems in Spain, Italy and Germany are still 
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largely disconnected from the core and in some cases peripheral. The basic 
economic motivation for building HSR infrastructure is the existence of a 
commercial demand for high speed connection and a gap in the capacity. However, 
in many instances, the willingness to pay for HSR service is certainly not sufficient 
to cover construction, maintenance and operating costs, which are variable and often 
very high7, nor is it clear whether social benefits are able to compensate for those 
costs everywhere.  
The motivation, therefore, cannot be found either on purely financial or 
economic grounds. It probably lies in the will of the national rail companies to 
compete with air and car transport to regain lost market share, and in the interest of 
the largest national companies to develop a proprietary HSR technology. Subsidiary 
to this is the strategic choice of the EU to create a protected market large enough to 
allow European manufacturers to maintain and possibly foster their competitive 
edge in HSR technology. Operators, who often run both tracks and services on many 
links, seek to use innovation strategically. To gain market share in the global HSR 
market they need to gain and retain control in the domestic market and to use it to 
promote their own technology. Indeed, large integrated European companies such as 
SNCF (and affiliates) and DB increasingly compete with their own individual HSR 
technologies (TGV, Eurostar, ICE, TAV, etc.) for the service on the tracks of the 
European network, where patronage is highest, and also with Canadian, Japanese 
and, more recently, Chinese competitors to gain market penetration in the networks 
that are fast growing in large economies such as China (Wright, 2010).     
 
7.  Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment 
 
The 2008-9 credit crisis forced European governments to raise the average 
budget deficit in the euro area from 2% to 6.3% and the average debt to GDP ratio 
from 69.4% to 78.7% in 2009 (Eurostat, 2010). The worsening, which by no means 
reflects efforts to increase infrastructure investment, has made debt spreads widen 
dramatically, impairing the ability of peripheral countries to face debt obligations. 
The initial deterioration and the ensuing worsening of market conditions, therefore, 
have severely reduced the capacity of governments to invest in infrastructure either 
with public resources such as tax revenues or/and debt finance. The reaction of the 
EU to the crisis in 2010 consisted in the introduction firstly of a temporary rescue 
scheme (the EFSF until 2013) and subsequently with a permanent rescue scheme 
(EMS since 2013). Such schemes imply loans to the country hit by a surge in debt 
spreads (as was the case of Greece and Ireland in 2010). A further decision was 
about strengthening the Stability and Growth pact, i.e. the surveillance mechanism 
on the budget and debt position of the Member Countries. The ECB itself started 
intervening in specific segments of the bond market (Greece, Ireland, Portugal in 
                                               
7 De Rus – Nash (2007) demonstrated why HSR infrastructure should be justified on the basis of 
number of travellers and their willingness to pay on a single link.  
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2010). There is, therefore, a danger that a tough and prolonged fiscal consolidation 
would end up worsening the traditional bias against net investment and particularly 
infrastructure investment everywhere in Europe. 
  To eliminate this bias, the so-called golden rule in fiscal policy has been 
advocated at least from the early years of adoption of the SGP (e.g. Blanchard, 
2004). According to this rule, the public budget does not impose a burden on future 
generations if public current spending is paired by current receipts. Net investment, 
therefore, could be financed by raising debt. To make government pursue the golden 
rule, the SGP should then keep the current budget separate from the capital budget 
and penalize only a current budget deficit. Thus a government should be asked to 
keep current expenses (depreciation allowances and interest payment included) 
balanced with current receipts, at least on average along the cycle8 and allowed to 
finance only net investment.. The goal pursued with this budget rule is to avoid 
mounting pressure on public debt reduction ending up worsening the 
underinvestment trend observed in the European countries in the last decades. The 
positive effect of this rule could be increased if the debt were issued by the EU 
directly or by the Member Countries under the guarantee offered by the EU in order 
to limit its effects on the spreads.   
 
8.  The Governance Issue 
 
Central and local governments often have different agendas and the two do 
not necessarily match. In all democratic systems, therefore, a balance between the 
instances of the different levels of government must be found to reach the common 
good. When governance is not up to the needs, such a result is lacking and projects 
are destined to flounder, caught in a web of overlapping central and local 
competencies. Also citizens have their own preferences and usually only some of 
them benefit while others lose from infrastructure building, particularly in the case 
of HSR. Equity, therefore, calls for some form of compensation, which in turn 
requires determining whether the willingness to pay of the beneficiaries really 
exceeds the compensation due to the losers. Specific procedures and mechanisms 
such as the enquête publique and the débat publique in France and the public inquiry 
in Britain have been devised to find equilibrium. 
Italy is a case of unclear and not shared division of responsibilities over the 
location of infrastructure. On one side, there is a potential increase in the role of 
local administrations over development strategy and policy as shown by the 
institutions of ordinary regions (1970), non-ordinary regions and autonomous 
provinces (1972) and, lately, fiscal federalism. On the other side, there is the will to 
increase the role of the central government as regards major infrastructures. The 
                                               
8 Current expenditure must be lower than current receipts if the debt has to be reduced 
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Target Bill9 (2001) was purposely introduced to promote strategic infrastructures by 
shifting the balance from local to central government and by increasing the role of 
private capital. Its very existence demonstrates that governance is a big issue in 
Italy. So far, the bill has not been able to increase funding and financing adequately 
and speed up planning and implementation (Signorini, 2009).  Governance is a 
common problem and is a further hurdle to progress in the TEN-T. There is no 
general rule or paradigm since each country has its own governance, but the EC 
through the Expert Group 1 has recently tried to fix ideas about objectives and 
methodologies in transport network planning (EC Expert Group 1, 2010) to be used 
in the different political contexts. 
 
9.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The realization of a single multimodal transport network (TEN-T) as a part 
of Trans European networks (TENs) is the translation of the infrastructure policy 
envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Together with the single currency, these 
networks were intended to deepen internal integration and thus to derive full benefit 
from the single market and the single currency. HSR and modern transport 
management systems, which absorb the larger part of available resources, aim to 
qualitatively improve infrastructure capital and also to permit the biggest European 
integrated transport companies and  manufacturers to use their control on the 
domestic market to improve  technology and thus to compete in the global market 
more effectively. From a purely macroeconomic point of view, infrastructure 
investment and public capital also represent an effort to make the stock of capital 
increase faster than GDP, i.e. to reverse the downtrend in investment-to-GDP which 
is a typical feature of mature economies. From the same point of view, infrastructure 
investment has failed to be used as an instrument to counter a slump in real demand. 
Good reasons to promote infrastructure investment are not in short supply. 
Nevertheless, the EU, the national governments and the private investors, although 
for different reasons, have not been able to cooperate to make TEN-T and, in 
particular, Priority Projects progress as hoped, at least so far. The funding gap has 
always been and remains the most evident obstacle to the actual full implementation 
of TEN-T. There is evidence that EU enlargement has compounded the effects of 
deepening internal integration on the demand of infrastructure capital. The saving 
                                               
9 The Target Bill (Legge Obiettivo) is backed by the Public Contract Code (Codice dei contratti 
pubblici, 2006) and a number of special execution procedures. It failed to indicate priorities and did not 
indicate any  useful criteria for  identifying them in the long list of projects.  While diminishing the role 
of local authorities and Communities, the Target Bill gives the biggest role to the Treasury and the 
Transport and Infrastructure Ministry (CIPE). A parallel initiative was the introduction of the 
Emergence Decree (Decreto sulle Emergenze, 2008) giving large resources and a major role to the 
Civil Protection Department, that is to the Head of government, in matters such as major emergencies 
and major events. The government, however, failed to find approval for the bill transforming the 
Department into a limited liability private company.  
64 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XIV, Issue (3), 2011 
 
glut of the past and the related low average level of long-term real interest rates 
created a very favourable scenario during the past twenty years, but have not been 
able to match the increase in the demand for infrastructure capital implied by TEN-T 
with an increase of funds. These favourable conditions are predicted to weaken 
considerably in the coming years. Also the fiscal rules of the European monetary 
union and the ongoing fiscal consolidation are deemed to reduce the ability of 
governments to fund infrastructure investment, although the golden rule of fiscal 
policy offers the possibility to avoid this hurdle. These are by no means the sole 
obstacles to the completion of TEN-T. The credit crunch, the technical difficulties of 
some specific links, the low profitability of many projects and the governance issue 
are other problematic aspects touched on in the paper.  
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